













In	 early	 2012,	 76	 heavily	 armed	 police	 conducted	 a	 raid	 on	 a	 house	 in	 Auckland,	 New	
Zealand.	 The	 targets	 were	 Kim	 Dotcom,	 a	 German	 national	 with	 a	 NZ	 residency	 visa,	 and	
several	 colleagues	 affiliated	 with	 Megaupload,	 an	 online	 subscription‐based	 peer‐to‐peer	
(P2P)	file	sharing	facility.	The	alleged	offences	involved	facilitating	unlawful	file	sharing	and	
United	 States	 federal	 criminal	 copyright	 violations.	 Following	 the	 raid,	 several	 court	 cases	
provide	 valuable	 insights	 into	 emerging	 ‘global	 policing’	 practices	 (Bowling	 and	 Sheptycki	
2012)	based	on	communications	between	sovereign	enforcement	agencies.		This	article	uses	










On	20	 January	2012,	New	Zealand	 (NZ)	Police	 conducted	a	 ‘dramatic’	 raid	dubbed	 ‘Operation	
Debut’	(Amsterdam	and	Rothken	2013:	7,	14)	on	a	$30	million	mansion	in	the	Auckland	suburb	
of	Coatesville.	Their	target	was	the	eponymously	named	Kim	Dotcom,	owner	and	developer	of	
file	 sharing	 site	Megaupload.	 Activities	 on	 this	 site	were	 subject	 to	 extensive	 surveillance	 by	
United	States	(US)	Federal	Bureau	of	 Investigation	(FBI)	officials,	as	well	as	NZ	Police	and	the	
NZ	 Government	 Communications	 Security	 Bureau	 (GCSB).	 The	 raid	 involved	 76	 NZ	 Police	
officers,	including	members	of	the	Armed	Offender’s	Squad	and	Special	Tactics	Group	equipped	
with	 rifles	 and	 semi‐automatic	 weapons,	 several	 police	 dogs	 and	 two	 helicopters	 (Editorial	











Two	 suspects	 eventually	 spent	 seven	months	 ‘detained	 in	 a	 foreign	 country	 away	 from	 their	
families	and	ordinary	places	of	residence’	(United	States	of	America	v	Dotcom	#2	[2012]	NZHC	













involvement	 in	 violent	behaviour	warrants	 further	 scrutiny	 in	 light	of	 the	 ‘priorities,	 policies,	
practices	and	accountability’	associated	with	transnational	policing	arrangements	(Bowling	and	
Sheptycki	2012:	1).	However	our	purpose	 is	 to	 interrogate	 the	enforcement	processes	 in	 this	
case,	 as	 a	measure	 of	 several	 key	 transformations	 in	 global	 policing	 (Bowling	 and	 Sheptycki	
2012;	Palmer	et	al.	2012).	Specifically,	concern	over	the	extension	of	historical	offences	such	as	
copyright	 breaches	 to	 regulate	 new	 forms	 of	 digital	 crime	 that	 transcend	 conventional	
sovereign	borders	has	contributed	to	the	extensive	growth	of	‘extraterritorial’	law	enforcement	
(Nadelmann	1993).	The	Kim	Dotcom	saga	reveals	several	accountability	deficits	associated	with	
emerging	 international	 police	 cooperation,	 surveillance	 and	 extraterritorial	 law	 enforcement	
initiatives.		
	
The	 initial	 identification	 of	Megaupload	 as	 a	 potential	 site	 for	 US	 copyright	 piracy	 violations	
commenced	in	the	US,	where	a	Grand	Jury	hearing	in	the	state	of	West	Virginia	confirmed	there	





either	US	nor	NZ	 law	enforcement	agencies	had	hoped,	and	promises	 to	 take	several	years	 to	
formally	resolve.	This	is	partially	due	to	the	significant	financial,	legal	and	intellectual	resources	
Dotcom	 has	 been	 able	 to	 employ	 to	 challenge	 these	 global	 policing	 practices.	 Before	
documenting	the	tensions	to	global	policing	revealed	in	this	case,	we	situate	Dotcom’s	activities	






century,	 innovative	 uses	 of	 photographic	 and	 cinematographic	 technologies	 enabled	 the	
unlawful	 copying	and	smuggling	of	banned	 films	across	national	borders	 (Warren	2005).	The	
transnational	reach	of	digital	communications,	often	through	subscription	platforms	specifically	
engineered	 to	 share	 personal	 information,	magnifies	 the	 challenges	 for	 traditional	 notions	 of	
intellectual	property	law	that	sought	to	protect	revenue	derived	from	the	production	of	books,	






piracy	 to	 transcend	 established	 sovereign	 laws	 and	 enforcement	 processes	 (Yar	 2005).	 The	
financial	 stakes	 are	 considerable,	 with	 estimates	 suggesting	 the	 net	 annual	 costs	 of	 illegally	
downloaded	 films,	 television	and	music	content	by	Australian	 internet	users	 is	around	$A900	
million	(McMahon	2011).	These	issues	can	only	be	reconciled	by	balancing:	
	
...	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 and	 human	 rights	 (to	 privacy	 and	 freedom	 of	




Perhaps	 the	 most	 significant	 factor	 associated	 with	 online	 piracy	 is	 the	 development	 of	
subscription‐based	 peer‐to‐peer	 (P2P)	 file	 sharing,	 social	 networking	 and	 cloud	 computing	
platforms	enabling	users	to	exchange	and	access	the	personal	files	of	other	registered	users.	In	
the	 current	 ‘global	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 regime’	 (David	 2010:	 5)	 the	 scale	 of	 copyright	
violations	 that	 occur	 through	 P2P	 or	 cloud	 computing	 remains	 unknown.	 However,	 these	
platforms	 generate	 extensive	 concern	 amongst	 the	 entertainment	 industry.	 While	 some	
copyright	holders	have	introduced	technical	measures	–	such	as	‘cyberlockers’	–	to	prevent	the	
illegal	duplication,	downloading	or	sharing	of	protected	works,	these	measures	are	often	easily	
subverted	 or	 have	 limited	 impact	 in	 curbing	 online	 piracy	 (Lauinger	 et	 al.	 2013).	 The	
entertainment	 industry	 favours	prohibition,	heavy	regulation	or	 increased	surveillance	by	 law	
enforcement	 agencies	 and	major	 film,	 television	 and	music	production	 companies,	 to	prevent	




artists	 or	 producers	 of	 original	 musical,	 film	 and	 television	 works	 (Marshall	 2002;	 Mazzone	
2011).	 However,	 the	 digital	 age	 has	 intensified	 criminalisation	 of	 online	 piracy	 and	 certain	
modes	 of	 P2P	 file	 sharing	 (David	 2010).	 Law	 enforcement	 agencies	 in	 the	 UK	 (SOCA	 2013),	
Australia	(ACC	2011:	73‐75)	and	the	US	identify	 intellectual	property	crime,	online	piracy	and	
the	 production	 of	 counterfeit	 hardcopies	 of	 films	 and	 music,	 as	 significant	 organised	 crime	
problems	with	potential	links	to	terrorist	activity	(David	2010:	97‐100).	Criminalisation	of	these	
behaviours	is	tied	to	the	‘transformation	of	the	language’	(Bowling	and	Sheptycki	2013:	35)	of	
transnational	 wrongdoing	 that	 has	 emerged	 in	 various	 global	 institutions	 and	 official	 United	
Nations	reports	since	the	1970s.	While	initial	forms	of	global	criminalisation	focused	largely	on	
the	 ‘trans‐boundary	 economic	 and	 social	 effects’	 of	 Western	 corporate	 business	 activities	 in	
developing	 nations,	 more	 recently	 the	 focus	 has	 shifted	 to	 protecting	 developed	 Western	
nations	 from	 the	 threats	 of	 transnational	 organised	 crime,	 drug	 trafficking	 and	 terrorist	
activities.	 These	 concerns	 are	 frequently	 ‘scripted	 by	 transnational	 policing	 actors’	 through	
networks	 promoting	 highly	 selective	 national	 law	 enforcement	 interests	 (Bowling	 and	




occur	 in	 a	 political	 climate	 that	 favours	 the	 expansion	 of	 criminal	 laws	 and	 enhanced	 global	
policing	networks	targeting	individuals	engaging	in	various	activities	that	are	potentially	illegal	
in	 one	 jurisdiction	 regardless	 of	 their	 geographic	 location.	 The	 expansion	 of	 extraterritorial	
criminal	 laws	and	enforcement	methods	has	arguably	been	most	notable	 in	 the	area	of	 illegal	
drug	trafficking	(Andreas	and	Nadelman	2006;	Costa	2004;	Kontorovic	2009),	and	occurs	either	










their	 own	 jurisdictional	 borders,	 raise	 numerous	 questions	 regarding	 extraterritorial	 policing	
activities	that	are	seldom	addressed	by	global	criminal	prohibitions	on	internet	piracy.	This	case	
study	 allows	 us	 to	 explore	 these	 issues	 in	 detail	 via	 the	 extensive	 body	 of	 NZ	 court	 rulings	





and	 managed	 various	 businesses	 associated	 with	 Megaupload,	 a	 cloud	 computing	 platform	
allowing	registered	users	 to	share	digital	photographs,	music	and	 films	with	other	subscribed	





there	 was	 sufficient	 evidence	 gathered	 in	 the	 US,	 including	 10	 million	 intercepted	 emails,	
‘voluminous	 financial	 records	 obtained	 from	 a	 number	 of	 different	 countries’	 and	 data	
contained	 in	 rented	 servers	 located	 in	 the	US	 (United	 States	 of	America	 v	Dotcom	#2	 [2012]	
NZHC	 1353	 at	 paras	 19‐20),	 to	 support	 federal	 criminal	 indictments	 alleging	 ‘breach	 of	
copyright,	 conspiracy	 to	 breach	 copyright,	 conspiracy	 to	 racketeer	 and	 money	 laundering’	
(Dotcom	 v	 Attorney‐General	 #1	 [2012]	NZHC	 1494	 at	 para	 10).	 This	 combination	 of	 charges	
targets	the	unlawful	profits	from	site	subscribers	and	other	Megaupload	revenue	streams	that	
were	 linked	 to	 alleged	 criminal	 copyright	 violations	 under	 US	 law.	 Therefore,	 even	 if	
Megaupload	 developers	 or	 site	 administrators	 committed	 no	 copyright	 violations	 per	 se,	 the	






once	 the	 indictments	 were	 approved	 in	 the	 US.	 Mutual	 assistance	 legislation	 is	 commonly	
enacted	 in	 most	 jurisdictions	 under	 international	 treaty	 requirements	 (Joutsen	 2005)	 to	
facilitate	 transnational	 police	 investigations.	 The	 formal	 request	 sought	 the	 collection	 and	
transfer	 of	 any	 additional	 ‘evidence,	 fruits,	 and	 instrumentalities	 of	 the	 crimes	 being	
investigated’	(Dotcom	v	Attorney‐General	#1	[2012]	NZHC	1494	at	para	19),	including	physical	
property	 such	 as	 computers,	 hard	 drives	 and	 financial	 statements	 related	 to	 Dotcom	 or	 the	
Megaupload	businesses,	as	well	as	statements	from	any	witnesses	located	in	NZ.	On	19	January	
2012,	a	NZ	District	Court	Judge	approved	search	warrants	drafted	in	these	general	terms.	On	the	




NZ	 courts	 challenging	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 raids,	 the	 seizure	 of	 computers,	 hard	 drives	 and	
personal	property	by	NZ	police,	and	the	subsequent	cloning	and	transfer	of	digital	evidence	to	
US	 authorities.	 Between	 29	 February	 2012	 and	 9	 April	 2013,	 13	 major	 NZ	 court	 rulings	
examined	whether	Dotcom	has	the	right	to	access	details	about	any	information	transferred	to	
the	 US	 to	 assist	 in	 preparing	 arguments	 for	 an	 extradition	 hearing	 and	 any	 subsequent	 US	
criminal	 proceedings.	 An	 additional	 series	 of	 legal	 claims	 challenged	 the	 validity	 of	 asset	















Legal	 challenges	 to	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 search	warrants	 and	Dotcom’s	 claims	 for	 disclosure	 of	
evidence	 transferred	 to	 US	 authorities	 are	 interrelated.	 In	 a	 lengthy	 ruling,	 Chief	 Justice	
Winkelmann	 declared	 the	 warrants	 were	 legally	 invalid	 under	 NZ	 law	 because	 they	 did	 not	




to	 the	 US	 indictments.	 Evidence	 from	 a	 warrant	 later	 declared	 invalid	 is	 admissible	 in	 US	






A	 further	 question	 involves	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	 any	 data	 to	US	 investigators	 by	NZ	
Police	under	the	terms	of	the	Mutual	Assistance	in	Criminal	Matters	Act	1992	(NZ)	(MACMA)	(A‐G	
re	 GCSB	 v	Dotcom	 et	 al.	 [2013]	NZCA	 43	 para	 58).	 All	 data	 from	 computers	 and	 hard	 drives	
seized	during	the	raid	were	cloned	by	NZ	Police,	then	transferred	to	the	FBI.	This	was	contrary	
to	an	express	directive	from	the	NZ	Solicitor‐General	to	retain	the	evidence	pending	a	NZ	court	
hearing	 to	 determine	 which	 specific	 items	 of	 evidence	 could	 be	 lawfully	 provided	 to	 US	
authorities	(s.	49,	MACMA	1992).	This	unlawful	global	policing	practice	was	only	discovered	in	
judicial	review	proceedings.	That	the	NZ	Police	could	simply	ignore	the	chief	law	officer	of	the	




Chief	 Justice	 Winkelmann	 ordered	 any	 clones	 of	 digital	 hard	 drives	 containing	 personal	
information	 irrelevant	 to	 the	US	 indictments	be	returned	to	NZ	 in	 light	of	 this	breach	and	the	
invalidity	of	 the	search	warrants	(A‐G	re	GCSB	v	Dotcom	et	al.	 [2013]	NZCA	43	at	para	11).	A	
subsequent	 ruling	 has	 affirmed	 original	 and	 cloned	 data	 collected	 during	 the	 raid	 under	 the	
MACMA	arrangement	were	unlawfully	obtained.	As	a	result,	NZ	Police	must	provide	a	full	audit	
of	all	information	seized	and	transferred	to	US	officials,	all	material	irrelevant	to	the	indictments	




Kim	 Dotcom	 has	 also	 sought	 the	 disclosure	 of	 specific	 evidence	 held	 by	 US	 enforcement	
authorities	 to	assist	his	preparations	 for	an	extradition	hearing	 in	NZ	and	any	subsequent	US	
criminal	 proceedings.	US	 authorities	have	 resisted	 these	 requests	due	 to	 fears	disclosure	will	
prejudice	 the	 prosecution	 case.	 A	 Record	 of	 the	 Case	must	 summarise	 the	 allegations	 in	 the	
indictment	and	provide	sufficient	detail	of	evidence	to	sustain	the	extradition	request.	Dotcom	
argued	 the	 failure	 to	allow	sufficient	disclosure	compromises	principles	of	 fairness	associated	
with	criminal	 trials	 (ss.	24‐25,	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990).	This	argument	was	rejected,	as	 the	
procedural	requirements	for	extradition	hearings	‘are	not	of	a	scale	that	would	be	afforded	in	a	
full	hearing	[trial]	to	determine	whether	a	charge	is	proved’	(United	States	of	America	v	Dotcom	


















This	 means	 Dotcom	 is	 only	 able	 to	 access	 summaries	 of	 evidence	 in	 the	 Record	 of	 the	 Case	
prepared	by	US	authorities	to	establish	the	case	for	extradition,	with	additional	evidence	only	to	









assistance	 requests	 contribute	 to	 diluted	 legal	 standards	 relating	 to	 search	 and	 seizure,	
extradition	 and	 information	 disclosure,	 and	 highlights	 the	 potential	 for	 extraterritorial	
investigations	 to	 influence	 legal	 developments	 in	 other	 nations	 in	 favour	 of	 selective	
transnational	law	enforcement	objectives	(Bowling	and	Sheptycki	2012:	41‐2).	These	processes	






After	 ruling	 the	 search	 warrants	 were	 invalid,	 Chief	 Justice	 Winkelmann	 suggested	 the	
unreasonable	search	and	seizure	(s.	21,	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990;	Dotcom	v	Attorney‐General	
#1	 [2012]	 NZHC	 1494	 at	 paras	 89	 and	 145)	 could	 be	 open	 to	 a	 common	 law	 claim	 for	
compensation	(Smillie	1994).	This	issue	was	not	raised	by	either	party	and	only	emerged	after	
several	teleconferences	and	the	exchange	of	memoranda	during	proceedings.	Dotcom	and	one	




…	emotional	harm,	 the	cost	of	 reinstating	electronic	componentry	at	one	of	 the	
properties	searched,	the	cost	of	repairing	damage	to	the	properties	and	the	costs	




Common	 law	 remedies	 for	 violations	 of	 the	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990	provide	 ‘vindication	…	
compensation	and	denunciation’	for	the	unlawful	actions	of	government	agencies	(A‐G	re	GCSB	











defendants	 in	 an	 amended	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 compensation	 claim	 endorsed	 by	 Chief	 Justice	
Winkelmann	on	5	December	2012	(Dotcom	v	Attorney‐General	#3	[2012]	NZHC	3268).	
	
The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 acknowledged	 the	 ‘present	 case	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	 unforeseen	




unlawful	 surveillance	 activity	 targeting	 Dotcom,	 his	 business	 associates	 and	 their	 respective	
families	 that	was	 subsequently	 conveyed	 to	 NZ	 Police	 to	 assist	 their	 investigations.	 This	 has	
generated	 additional	 claims	 seeking	 disclosure	 of	 this	 information	 and	 details	 of	 any	
intelligence‐sharing	agreements	between	the	NZ	Police	and	GCSB,	including	the	dates	and	times	
any	unlawful	surveillance	was	conducted.	These	claims	extend	to	any	information	provided	to	
‘other	members	 of	 Echelon/“Five	 Eyes”’,	 a	 signals	 intelligence	 sharing	 arrangement	 involving	








43	at	para	26).	The	amount	of	damages	was	 to	be	determined	prior	 to	 the	commencement	of	






was	 transferred	 to	 US	 officials	 under	 the	MACMA	1992	 agreement.	 This	 ruling	will	 also	 have	





flows	 within	 and	 between	 NZ	 and	 US	 enforcement	 authorities	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	
judicial	review	as	a	meaningful	forum	to	scrutinise	global	police	investigations.	The	very	active	
role	 of	 Chief	 Justice	Winkelmann	 in	 ‘calling	 out’	 the	 potential	 for	Baigent’s	 compensation	has	
produced	 significant	 admissions	 from	 the	 GCSB	 and	 NZ	 Police	 about	 their	 involvement	 in	
unlawful	 surveillance	 and	 information	 transfer.	 This	 common	 law	 remedy	 has	 significant	
financial	and	symbolic	deterrent	effects	that	reinforce	the	importance	of	localised	human	rights	
requirements	 and	 legal	 standards	 that	 affect	 police	 agencies	 receiving	 mutual	 assistance	













Variously	described	as	 a	 ‘big,	 jovial	 internet	mogul’	 (Editorial	2012),	 a	 ‘controversial	 internet	
tycoon’	(Bennett	2013),	‘one	of	the	world’s	most	“flamboyant”	computer	hackers’	(Fisher	2011),	
a	‘celebrity	du	jour’	and	a	‘larger‐than‐life	oddball’	(Rudman	2013),	Dotcom	remains	an	enigma	





2013)	 and	 fuels	 unnecessary	 public	 anxieties	 that	 challenge	 NZ’s	 national	 security	 interests	






Kimble	 Goes	 to	 Monaco	 Part	 II,	 which	 star	 leading	 German	 female	 centrefold	 models	 and	
document	his	penchant	for	fast	cars,	yachts	and	partying	at	the	2000	and	2001	Monaco	Grand	
Prix	(Pappademas	2012).	Before	Kimble	officially	changed	his	surname	to	Dotcom	in	2005	when	
Megaupload	was	 formally	 established	 in	Hong	Kong,	 he	was	 convicted	 of	 insider	 trading	 and	
pleaded	 guilty	 to	 embezzlement	 under	 German	 law,	 which	 lead	 to	 two	 20‐month	 probation	
terms	 and	 fines	 totalling	 €100,000	 (Gallagher	 2012).	 After	 the	 NZ	 raids,	 he	 publicly	 warned	












The	 theatrics	 of	 the	NZ	 raid	 and	 its	 global	 depiction	 as	 news	 replicates	 other	 large‐scale	 law	
enforcement	and	securitisation	initiatives.	The	desire	to	assist	the	FBI	with	its	MACMA	request	
undoubtedly	promoted	the	construction	of	an	image	of	NZ	policing	as	tough,	uncompromising	






Hollywood’	 (Amsterdam	 and	 Rothken	 2013:	 14‐16)	 involved	 questionable	 force	 with	 lasting	
impacts	on	Dotcom,	his	pregnant	wife	and	his	three	children,	have	been	met	by	counterclaims	
that	 police	 misconduct	 was	 defensible,	 as	 police	 were	 forced	 to	 enter	 a	 secure	 ‘panic	 room’	
while	 Dotcom’s	 burly	 figure	 lunged	 towards	 a	 firearm.	 It	 was	 later	 reported	 the	 weapon	
remained	inside	a	locked	safe	and	was	loaded	with	a	single	rubber	bullet	(Fisher	2012).	
	
In	 May	 2012,	 a	 48‐page	 whitepaper	 co‐authored	 by	 two	 lawyers	 working	 for	 Dotcom	
systematically	attacked	the	 ‘baseless’	allegations	and	‘dubious	legal	principles’	associated	with	
‘the	largest	copyright	case	in	history’.	US	concern	over	the	criminal	enterprise	neglected	various	





2013:	 2‐5).	 However,	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Justice	 claims	 that	 regular	 violations	 of	 a	
permissible	 daily	 threshold	 of	 5,000	 ‘copyright	 takedowns’,	 largely	 detected	 through	
surveillance	of	 file	 sharing	 activity	 in	Megaupload	by	 the	US	entertainment	 industry,	 justified	
criminal	 prosecution	 due	 to	 the	 evident	 failure	 of	 voluntary	 compliance	 with	 numerous	
directives	 issued	 by	 US	 law	 enforcement	 officials	 (Fisher	 2012).	 The	 whitepaper	 challenges	
these	 justifications	 for	 such	 an	 ‘overly	 expansive	 and	 unsupported	 legal	 theory	 of	 criminal	
liability’	 that	 tests	 the	 limits	 of	 conventional	 notions	of	US	 sovereignty	 and	has	been	 ‘littered	
with	due	process	violations’	(Amsterdam	and	Rothken	2013:	 	5‐11).	Of	specific	concern	 is	 the	
confiscation	 of	 all	Megaupload	property	 and	user	 data	 under	US	 law	via	 ‘an	 ex	 parte	 hearing	






These	 issues	 must	 be	 considered	 alongside	 news	 of	 the	 NSA’s	 Prism	 surveillance	 program,	
which	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 source	 of	much	 online	 surveillance	 undertaken	 by	US	 authorities	 to	
support	 the	 federal	 criminal	 indictments.	 Global	 revelations	 about	 Prism	 provided	 the	
opportunity	 for	 Dotcom	 to	 publicly	 affirm	 that	 his	 concerns	 about	 the	 role	 of	 ‘the	 state	 as	 a	
potential	 threat	 to	 basic	 civil	 rights	 and	 liberties	 –	 may	 have	 been	 right	 all	 along’	 (Dotcom	
2013).	In	an	informed	opinion	piece	for	The	Guardian,	which	was	one	of	the	major	news	outlets	
documenting	leaks	about	the	global	 implications	of	Prism’s	online	surveillance	activities	along	
with	 the	Washington	Post,	Dotcom	reiterated	key	arguments	 in	 the	whitepaper	 indicating	 this	




have	 some	 sound	 basis	 in	 US	 copyright	 law,	 but	 because	 the	 US	 justice	
department	 has	 been	 instrumentalised	 by	 certain	 private	 interests	 that	 have	 a	
financial	 stake	 in	neutralising	my	business.	That	 trend	 represents	 a	danger	not	
just	to	me,	but	to	all	of	us	(Dotcom	2013).	
	
Once	 news	 of	 Prism	 emerged,	 the	 American	 Civil	 Liberties	 Union	 (ACLU)	 re‐launched	 a	
significant	 case	 against	 the	 US	 federal	 government	 alleging	 the	 breach	 of	 several	 civil	 rights	
protections	 under	 the	 US	 Constitution.	 The	 ACLU	 uses	 Verizon,	 one	 of	 three	 major	 US	
telecommunications	 companies	 that	 allegedly	 supplies	 the	NSA	with	 ‘metadata’	 revealing	 the	
identity	 of	 phone	 numbers	 and	 the	 time,	 length	 and	 location	 of	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 calls	
throughout	 the	 US	 (American	 Civil	 Liberties	 Union	 v	 Clapper	 2013	 at	 para	 31).	 The	 ACLU	
questions	 this	 surveillance	 practice.	 One	 reason	 is	 many	 telephone	 communications	 involve	
legally	 privileged	 discussions	 with	 clients	 regarding	 actual	 or	 prospective	 legal	 proceedings	
against	 US	 federal	 agencies	 (American	 Civil	 Liberties	 Union	 v	 Clapper	 2013	 at	 para	 25).	
Proposed	legislative	reforms	in	NZ	will	allow	the	GCSB	to	access	equivalent	telecommunications	
metadata.	 Thus,	 Kim	 Dotcom’s	 advocacy	 converges	 around	 several	 crucial	 political	
developments	 associated	 with	 state	 surveillance	 practices	 in	 NZ	 and	 the	 US,	 which	 are	
intertwined	 with	 the	 expanded	 transnational	 reach	 of	 US	 criminal	 laws,	 enforcement	 and	
mutual	assistance	initiatives	associated	with	online	piracy.	The	launch	of	MEGA,	the	cloud‐based	
successor	 to	 Megaupload	 (Fletcher	 2013a),	 might	 add	 further	 weight	 to	 intensified	
transnational	criminal	copyright	enforcement	(Fletcher	2013b),	or	could	invoke	more	efficient	
data	 encryption	 (Barton	2013a)	 and	 digital	 blocking	 technology	 to	 prevent	 online	 piracy	 and	









The	 complexity	 of	 Kim	 Dotcom’s	 case	 highlights	 several	 technicalities	 and	 regulatory	 gaps	
associated	 with	 the	 global	 consumption	 of	 digital	 media	 (David	 2010)	 and	 commensurate	
deficits	 in	 the	 application	 of	 due	 process	 principles	 to	 transnational	 surveillance,	 intelligence	
gathering	 and	 law	 enforcement	 procedures.	 Principles	 of	 sovereignty	 that	 invoke	 territorial	




significant	 implications	 for	 notions	 of	 individual	 privacy	 (Drury	 2012).	 These	 issues	 are	
magnified	 in	 transnational	 criminal	 investigations	 where	 traditional	 national	 due	 process	
constraints	 governing	 state	 surveillance	 do	 not	 adequately	 encapsulate	 informal	 requests	 for	
investigative	 assistance,	 which	 may	 or	 may	 not	 be	 formalised	 through	 recognised	 mutual	
assistance	 requirements.	 Extensive	 transnational	 flows	 of	 criminal	 intelligence	 and	 other	





reveals	 several	 contradictions	 between	 US	 and	 NZ	 search	warrant,	 information	 seizure,	 data	
transfer	 and	 judicial	 review	procedures	 that	 are	 far	 from	being	 fully	 ‘harmonised’	 or	 aligned.	
Chief	 Justice	Winkelmann’s	 rulings	 declaring	 the	 NZ	 search	warrants	 to	 be	 invalid	might	 not	
have	 been	 able	 to	 prevent	 the	 initial	 unlawful	 transfer	 or	 destruction	 of	 sensitive	 personal	
information	about	registered	users	of	Megaupload	that	has	been	unlawfully	conveyed	to	US	law	
enforcement	 authorities.	 However,	 these	 rulings	 allow	 for	 the	 qualified	 disclosure	 of	 this	
information	 for	Kim	Dotcom’s	extradition	and	any	related	proceedings	associated	with	 the	US	
federal	 indictments.	Despite	 the	 initially	 informal	nature	of	 the	mutual	 assistance	 request,	 its	
subsequent	formalisation	and	the	related	court	rulings	associated	with	the	NZ	raid,	the	seizure	
of	 evidence,	 its	 cloning	 and	 ultimate	 transfer	 to	 the	 FBI	 were	 subject	 to rigorous	 judicial	
scrutiny	 in	 line	 with	 the	 local	 contingencies	 of	 NZ	 criminal	 and	 human	 rights	 laws.	 These	
avenues	 temper	 claims	 about	 the	 ‘Americanisation’	 of	 global	 policing	 via	 the	 regularisation,	






2013).	 However,	 for	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 people	 enmeshed	 in	 transnational	 criminal	
investigations,	 such	 resources	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 available.	 Further,	 the	 overall	 costs	 of	
deploying	 resources	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 extensive	 legal	 challenges	 associated	 with	
transnational	 criminal	 investigations	are	a	 significant	barrier	 to	open	and	 transparent	 justice,	
particularly	 due	 to	 the	 expenses	 associated	 with	 implementing	 mutual	 assistance	 requests,	
collecting	and	securely	transferring	evidence,	and	ensuring	witness	testimony	can	be	presented	
and	tested	in	court	proceedings	(Flynn	and	Fitz‐Gibbon	2013).	By	April	2012,	legal	challenges	in	
the	 Dotcom	 case	 cost	 NZ	 taxpayers	 an	 estimated	 $NZ1.12	 million,	 independently	 of	 the	
undisclosed	financial	costs	of	resources	provided	to	the	investigation	by	NZ	Police	and	the	GCSB.	
Further	estimates	suggest	these	costs	are	likely	to	increase	to	$NZ4	or	$NZ5	million	by	the	time	
of	 Dotcom’s	 extradition	 hearing	 (Barton	 2013b).	 By	 contrast,	 reports	 suggest	 that	 since	
Megaupload	 was	 closed	 by	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 two	 major	 movie	 studios	 report	
increased	 revenues	 of	 between	 $US1.1	 and	 $US1.9	 million	 from	 online	 sales	 and	 rental	
arrangements	(Collins	2013).	Such	figures	add	weight	to	the	financial	arguments	supporting	the	





2003),	 even	 though	 the	 main	 beneficiary	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 private	 entertainment	 industry	
rather	than	the	state.		
	
Case	 studies	 such	 as	 this	 are	 an	 important	 means	 of	 understanding	 contemporary	 global	
policing	 developments.	 Legal	 case	 analysis	 does	 not	 replace	 the	 need	 for	 thick	 descriptions	
emanating	 from	ethnographic	research	(Nadelmann	1993),	nor	does	 it	 seek	 to	re‐cloak	global	
policing	 developments	 within	 narrow	 and	 restrictive	 ‘rule‐of‐law’	 principles.	 Bowling	 and	
Sheptycki	(2012:	130)	caution	that	global	policing	should	not	be	understood	primarily	through	
the	rule‐of‐law.	Rather,	the	analysis	of	written	law	should	be	seen	as	a	resource	to	examine	‘rule	
with	 law’,	by	 circumscribing	global	policing	practices	 through	 law.	The	Dotcom	case	 indicates	
tensions	 between	 US	 and	 NZ	 policing	 approaches	 and	 legal	 requirements	 have	 significant	




extraterritorial	 policing	 activities,	 they	 could	 equally	 validate	 and	 entrench	 problematic	
transnational	 enforcement	 arrangements	 in	 other	 cases.	 The	 cases	 documented	 in	 this	 paper	
demonstrate	the	importance	of	formal	judicial	rulings	as	evidence	of	‘rule	with	law’	that	reveal	
the	relationship	between	external	review	and	legal	resistance	towards	the	unchecked	collection	
and	 distribution	 of	 criminal	 intelligence	 for	 transnational	 law	 enforcement	 purposes.	 These	







difficulties	 of	 applying	 the	 logics	 of	 criminalisation	 to	 regulate	 any	 transnational	 or	
international	 behaviour	 (Findlay	 2008).	 In	 the	 online	world,	 competing	 claims	 to	 justice	 and	
procedural	 fairness	 involve	 the	 simultaneous	 normalisation	 of	 contentious	 surveillance,	 data	
mining,	 locational	 tracking	 and	 other	 digital	 assemblage	 technologies	 in	 the	 contemporary	
global	policing	armoury	(Haggerty	and	Ericson	2006).	These	appear	logical	measures	to	combat	







global	 policing	 accountability	 mechanisms	 that	 acknowledges	 the	 prospect	 for	 meaningful	
resistance	to	questionable	extraterritorial	law	enforcement	activity	not	only	by	individuals	such	
as	 Dotcom,	 but	 also	 via	 activist	 civil	 libertarian	 groups	 and	 sovereign	 judicial	 review	
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